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(Mis)Information Operations: An Integrated Perspective
Abstract: The massive diffusion of social media fosters disintermediation and changes the way 
users are informed, the way they process reality, and the way they engage in public debate. The 
cognitive layer of users and the related social dynamics define the nature and the dimension of 
informational threats. Users show the tendency to interact with information adhering to their 
preferred narrative and to ignore dissenting information. Confirmation bias seems to account 
for users’ decisions about consuming and spreading content; and, at the same time, aggregation 
of favored information within those communities reinforces group polarization. In this work, the 
authors address the problem of (mis)information operations with a holistic and integrated 
approach. Cognitive weakness induced by this new information environment are considered. 
Moreover, (mis)information operations, with particular reference to the Italian context, are 
considered; and the fact that the phenomenon is more complex than expected is highlighted. The 
paper concludes by providing an integrated research roadmap accounting for the possible 
future technological developments.
Keywords: Echo Chambers, Information Management, Information Operations, Perception 
Management
Introduction
Information operations make use of information-related capabilities to influence, disrupt, 
corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of a target audience (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014).  These 
operations can include a combination of methods, such as false news, disinformation, or 
networks of fake accounts (false amplifiers), with the aim of manipulating public opinion. In 
this paper, the authors refer to (mis)information operations as the specific and organized use of 
misleading information to influence a target audience. While, on the strategic level, the aim is to 
influence public opinion and social perceptions on specific issues in order to alter the process of 
decision-making, on the tactical level, (mis)information operations aim to trigger specific social 
responses (such as encouraging consumers to share such content, vote certain ways, or 
participate in online debate) through the use of provocative content (Wanless & Berk 2019). 
Since the effect of (mis)information operations relies on the exploitation of social responses to 
specific issues, their strategies, tactics, and operational implementation may change together with 
social and technological developments.
Currently, the massive diffusion of sociotechnical systems and micro blogging platforms on the 
World Wide Web (WWW) created a new scenario for information consumption. This 
information ecosystem grounded on disintermediation—that is, the direct access to content 
through social media platforms—can be exploited by (mis)information operations. The new 
interaction patterns allow for a direct path from producers to consumers of content, and 
change the way users are informed, engage in debate, and develop opinions (Del Vicario et al. 
2016b). This shift, in turn, affects political communication (Stieglitz, Brockmann & Dang-Xuan 
2012) and the evolution of the public debate (Bond et al. 2012).
A multitude of mechanisms influence the way in which people share and absorb information. For 
example, the process of acceptance of a claim (whether documented or not) may be affected 
by normative social influence or by coherence with an individual system of beliefs. The 
problems arising from this renewed vulnerability to (mis)information operations do not seem to 
be well defined; indeed, several scientific works have produced conflicting definitions, results, 
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and insights both on a quantitative and a qualitative basis (Ruths 2019). Some think that the 
consequences of this disintermediated environment could be reduced to a fallacious antagonism: 
truth against false. However, social media dynamics are complex, and different factors may 
come into play when dealing with online human cognitions and preferences. Supporters of this 
dichotomous standpoint often forget that social media are mainly intended for ludic rather than 
for informative purposes (De Waal & Schoenbach 2010) and that news consumption on social 
media is often incidental rather than deliberate (Boczkowski, Mitchelstein & Matassi 2018). 
For example, the most liked image on Instagram is an egg (54 million likes).
In recent years, the concern about (mis)information has grown in importance. In 2017, the World 
Economic Forum raised a warning on the potential distortion effect of social media on the 
perception of reality (World Economic Forum WEF 2017). The challenge is pressing not only at 
the scientific level (Del Vicario et al. 2016b; Quattrociocchi 2017; Sunstein 2018; Schmidt, AL 
et al. 2017, Schmidt, AL et al. 2018b; Grinberg et al. 2019) but also at the political level to an 
extent that governments of Western democracies are pursuing initiatives to limit such a 
tendency, and social media companies are operating plans to counteract potential manipulation 
(Schmidt, C 2019). The stakes are high, particularly in democracies where trust in information is 
paramount to legitimacy of the system (Bimber 2003).
However, the emerging solutions are not likely to be effective, especially those adopting the 
above-mentioned dualistic approach. To this respect, an approach widely adopted by major news 
outlets focuses on contrasting misleading content by means of fact-checking news pieces. To un-
derstand why this approach is fallacious requires an understanding of the underlying dynamics of 
social media.  Along this path, quantitative studies showed the inner tendency of users to interact 
with information adhering to their preferred narrative (Del Vicario et al. 2016b) and to ignore 
dissenting information, for example in the case of debunking pieces (Zollo et al. 2017). In this 
respect, confirmation bias was shown to play a role in influencing users’ decisions about 
consuming and spreading content. This mechanism fosters the creation of echo chambers, self-
segregated groups of users clustering around and reinforcing shared narratives, while rejecting 
any possible alternative point of view (Quattrociocchi 2017; Sunstein 2018).
The role played by automation and the deliberate manipulation of online algorithms further 
exacerbates the situation. Heavily automated Twitter posts have been found to influence online 
news feeds and search returns (Mustafaraj & Metaxas 2010). Also, online search results have 
been found to affect political opinion (Epstein & Robertson 2015). Thus, it is not surprising that 
the scope of (mis)information operations are pursued and amplified by exploiting opportunities 
and vulnerabilities of web platforms. For instance, Internet bots (Vosoughi, Roy & Aral 2018), 
which can also exploit social network platforms (Compatno et al. 2015), have been found to play 
a role in increasing the speed of information spreading that is still hard to quantify in a precise 
way. In spite of these aspects, there is enough evidence to suggest that bots foster misinformation 
spreading in a manner leading the attitudes of some people to be more prone to engage with fake 
news than others (Guess, Nagler & Tucker 2019; Grinberg et al. 2019) and in influencing 
election/referendum outcomes and society as a whole (Grinberg et al. 2019, Vosoughi, Roy & 
Aral 2018, Del Vicario et al. 2017).
By reducing the phenomenon just to the dichotomous distinction between ‘trustworthy’ and ‘un-
reliable’ content, the overall picture is not being captured; thus, researchers are answering badly 
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flawed questions. This false dichotomy is a problem since it oversimplifies the issue about the con-
sequences of (mis)information operations in this new disintermediated information environment, 
drawing a line in the sand that is often difficult to discern, particularly at scale, but nearly impos-
sible to distinguish when it comes to something like political opinion; such an approach  is reduc-
tionist and fails to take into account the many cognitive issues that (mis)information operations 
deliberately provoke. To understand and hopefully address the consequences of (mis)information 
operations in this changing information environment, the tendency to seek information adhering 
to one’s worldview and to ignore dissenting information must be remembered. No matter whether 
offline or online, people tend to live and express themselves inside so-called echo chambers. (Sun-
stein 2002; Quattrociocchi 2017). Unfortunately, confirmation bias is inherent in human cognition 
and is not likely to be eliminated (Nickerson 1998). The good news, and the challenge, is that ad-
dressing misinformation might become possible through a multi-disciplinary collective approach.
The purpose of this work is to improve the understanding of the problem of (mis)information dif-
fusion in the current disintermediated information environment by embracing the complexity of 
human cognitions and interactions. The first section is devoted to the underlying social phenomena 
through the lens of cognitive and clinical psychology. In particular, the focus is on the role played 
by confirmation bias—with the consequent emergence of polarized groups of users—and on the 
relevance of specific personality traits in shaping the way social media users absorb and interact 
with information. In the second section, the focus is on the ecosystem of the new information en-
vironment and on the proliferation, within this environment, of automated ways of exploiting hu-
man vulnerabilities—along with algorithmic flaws—for (mis)information-operation purposes. Not 
only a brief overview of the social media ecosystem will be given, but also the main typologies of 
social bots will be described. The third section will deal with three Italian examples of misinforma-
tion in the political sphere, explored through a cognitive lens. The fourth section will be devoted 
to the discussion of a possible road map for further research on the topic. The main points of this 
work will be summarized in the last section.
Users Behavior through the Lens of Cognitive and Clinical Psychology
As already mentioned, it is necessary to start from the dynamics of social media in order to prop-
erly address the rising problem of (mis)information diffusion. These dynamics are not caused by 
social media but are the effects of human cognition operating in the media environment. For this 
reason, the field of cognitive psychology seems to offer the right set of conceptual tools to address 
the issue. Cognitive psychology is the branch of psychology dealing with the way people acquire, 
process, and memorize information (VandenBos 2007). In this case, understanding the way social 
media users absorb and process information online seems to be crucial.
On the Internet, a huge amount of information competes for viewers’ attention, which is instead 
limited; this allows their cognitive biases—shortcuts or heuristics that are used to simplify reality 
and (re)act rapidly (Haselton, Nettle & Murray 2015)—to take the lead in processing information. 
Humans use such biases to interpret reality. Unfortunately, while these cognitive mechanisms are 
often fundamental to survival, they might also act as mental traps and mislead viewers. A crucial 
role in information consumption and diffusion is played by confirmation bias, which is the human 
tendency to look for information that is already consistent with one’s system of beliefs. Indeed, 
online users tend to fragment into echo chambers (Del Vicario et al. 2016b)—polarized communi-
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ties whose users share a common narrative. Immersed in echo chambers, users select information 
consistent with their worldviews, even when false (Bessi et al. 2016), while ignoring information 
that dissents from their beliefs. Users from different and contrasting communities rarely interact; 
and, when that happens, the debate degenerates, especially for longer discussions (Zollo et al. 
2015). Response to debunking attempts is not that dissimilar and results in the well-known ‘back-
fire effect’, thus reinforcing users’ original positions (Zollo et al. 2017).
It is possible to quantify the turnover of Facebook news sources by measuring the heterogeneity 
of users’ activity. It may be observed that, for increasing levels of activity (number of likes) and 
‘lifetime’ (the temporal distance between the first and last interaction of a user to a post on the 
platform), users interact with increasingly fewer new sources (Schmidt, AL et al. 2017). News 
consumption on Facebook is therefore dominated by selective exposure (Cinelli 2019), showing 
a natural tendency of users to confine their activity to a limited set of pages, while focusing their 
attention on certain topics (and claims). This self-selection contributes to the formation of a high-
ly-polarized community structure. Such dynamics appear to be independent of the topic, and also 
apply to online political debates, such as the ones around Brexit or the Italian Constitutional Refer-
endum’s debate (Del Vicario et al. 2017). Users’ segregation in echo chambers may play a pivotal 
role in the spread of information on social media.
To contrast misinformation, and encourage effective communication, smoothing polarization is 
thus essential. To this end, users’ behavior and their interactions with information may be used 
for a timely identification of potential misinformation targets (Del Vicario et al. 2019). This could 
allow for the design of tailored counter-narratives and appropriate communication strategies. The 
EU H2020 project QUEST (https://questproject.eu) aims at analyzing, designing, testing, and eval-
uating different strategies to improve science communication on social media, with a special focus 
on delicate and polarizing topics such as climate change or vaccines (Schmidt, AL et al. 2018b). 
Along the same line, a recent investigation (Pomerantsev et al. 2019) analyzed the engagement 
of Corriere (a newspaper) readers with content touching on the controversial topic of 
migration in Italy. The purpose was to understand which types of journalism intensify or 
reduce polarization and identify the best way to communicate facts and foster constructive 
engagement. Findings indicate that impartial, accurate reporting draws the most institutional 
trust, while human interest stories can encourage strong negative comments from readers. 
Consistent with previous results, infographics, fact-checking, and a data-driven approach may 
elicit strong pushback and criticism from audiences and thus boost polarization.
Another aspect that deserves attention seems to be the predominance of specific psychological 
traits in the social media environment. Users exhibiting certain traits may be, in fact, more vulner-
able than others in promoting content which is the object of (mis)information operations. Such an 
approach exploits tools borrowed from clinical and personality psychology, which is the branch 
of psychology assessing the overall behavioral and health issues of the individuals (VandenBos 
2007). For example, individuals with high indicators of narcissism and lower levels of self-esteem 
seem to be associated with greater online activity (Mehdizadeh 2010). Moreover, the lack of emo-
tional regulation and coping results seems to be strictly associated with problematic Internet use 
(Spada & Marino 2017; Marino et al. 2017; Marino et al. 2018; Marino et al. 2019b). Even the 
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style of attachment to father and mother and metacognitions predict the problematic use of both 
Internet and social media (Marino et al. 2019a).
Evidence suggests a relationship between narcissistic personality disorder traits and passive data 
from social network sites, mainly the number of friends. A possible hypothesis for this relationship 
is the presence of the attention-seeking trait, which is also a core component of histrionic personal-
ity disorder. Narcissism together with aggression and lack of self-control also correlate with online 
game addiction (Kim et al. 2008; Eksi 2012). Other traits associated with a problematic usage of 
social media are shyness, loneliness, social anxiety, and lack of self-esteem (Chak & Leung 2004; 
Caplan 2006; Mehdizadeh 2010). However, these negative traits are not the only ones in play in 
this environment. The degree of influence in some communities seems to be more related to open-
ness, consciousness, and emotional competence (Zanotto 2017). Psychologists and sociologists 
depict a very complex scenario that, while providing some answers, also leaves many questions 
open and stimulates new questions. A future challenge might be the prediction of the problematic 
traits linked to a higher diffusion of misinformative content, but more generally, the profiling of 
users’ personalities on the basis of their (online) social activities.
‘(Mis)information Automation’ in the Changing Information Environment
Another phenomenon within the changing information environment that should be addressed is 
the presence of automated systems exploiting both the technical flaws emerging from such an 
environment and human cognitive biases. This changing information environment, with its disin-
termediation, presents exciting new opportunities for people to communicate, but has also proven 
to be a noisy space, where navigating between good and bad information is challenging for the 
average user. This environment is quite exposed to (mis)information operations and, in particular, 
the presence of automated bots further exacerbating the problem of misinformation diffusion by 
leveraging the previously-mentioned human vulnerabilities. Before fully getting into this issue of 
‘(mis)information automation’, it seems necessary to take a closer look at the components in the 
ecosystem of this disintermediated environment. One such component is represented by social 
bots.
Several interesting phenomena can be observed on social media, such as the proliferation of po-
litical pages and alternative information sources with the aim of using the Internet to organize and 
convey public discontent (Mocanu et al. 2015). Furthermore, very distinct groups, namely trolls, 
have emerged and built Facebook pages as a parodistic imitation of both alternative information 
sources and online political activists. Their activities range from controversial and satirical posts 
mimicking alternative news sources to outright fake claims. These memes may go viral and are 
used as evidence in online debates by political activists (Del Vicario et al. 2016a). High levels of 
distrust in official institutions help the diffusion of alternative, misleading explanations, both the 
unsubstantiated or inaccurate, including conspiracy theories which tend to explain a significant 
social or political aspect as a secret plot by powerful individuals or organizations. This kind of 
activity is proliferating within echo chambers. To make things even more complex, recent studies 
have shown that the social media environment is populated by a multitude of accounts purposely 
created to spread unsolicited spam, advertise products of doubtful legality, sponsor public figures, 
or influence the public opinion (Jiang, Cui & Faloutsos 2016).
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It is in this context that automation comes into play in various forms. For example, a social bot 
is a computer program that controls a social media account, mimicking a legitimate user, while a 
cyborg (Chu et al. 2012) blends characteristics of both manual and automated behavior. Several 
coordinated accounts cooperating towards a common goal constitute a social botnet. As already 
mentioned, these kinds of automated systems may increase the spread of misinformation by lever-
aging the tendencies in some people to be more vulnerable to deceptive information than others 
(Guess, Nagler & Tucker 2019; Grinberg et al. 2019). The threat is that the exploitation of these 
tools may lead to influencing election/referendum outcomes and society as a whole (Grinberg et 
al. 2019, Vosoughi, Roy & Aral, 2018, Del Vicario et al. 2017).
(Mis)information Operations in Italy
Myriad actors are using (mis)information operations to set agendas and shape public opinion. In an 
environment where mediators such as mainstream media are pressed to find a new business model 
that allows direct access to an unprecedented plethora of sources (Cinelli et al. 2019), the public 
gets lost in the large amount of misleading information they are exposed to, and this corrupts trust 
in favor of partisan debates. (Mis)information operations are seldom clear cut and often the activi-
ties of actors blur in the digital space, making it difficult to discern where one begins and the other 
ends. The Italian political debate is rife with (mis)information operations, as explored below.
For example, the Five Star Movement (the Movement), the Italian ‘non-party’, founded by a 
famous comedian, was supported by a coordinated network of social media pages and websites 
falling outside the official channels of the Movement. According to Nardelli and Silverman 
(2016), these pages and platforms relentlessly published misinformation ranging from conspiracy 
theories to partisan campaigns despite their claim of being “independent sources”. Their degree 
of independence is questionable, with some of these online holdings sharing IP addresses, 
Google Analytics and AdSense IDs with the Movement (Nardelli and Silverman 2016). The 
(mis)information operations used to support the Movement included activists sharing fake poll 
results indicating that the party had more support than it had at the time (Gavazzi 2018), the use 
of divisive issues such as immigration and vaccines (Mackay 2019) to provoke Italian audiences, 
and the use of fake social media accounts to amplify such content (Associated Press 2019).
Another case regarding one Facebook account that was closed highlights the blurred lines between 
actors attempting to shape the information environment. It was connected to media entrepreneur 
Giancarlo Colono, who own networks of websites (175 domains) and corresponding Facebook 
pages, pushing viral clickbait to “hyperpartisan pieces about immigration that echo nationalist and 
Islamophobic rhetoric” (Nardelli and Silverman 2017). Some of the pages owned by Colono, such 
as DirettaNews, have more than 3 million followers on Facebook. Colono and his family have 
also supported and reshared content online from the Catholic organization, La Luce di Maria, 
who propagandize the faith, and whose Facebook page shares alternative health posts and “tips 
to fight malevolent spells and the devil” (Nardelli and Silverman 2017). DirettaNews has been 
found to repost articles from La Luce di Maria. The La Luce di Mari web domain had 
been registered to one Roberto Granieri, whose Facebook account was an administrator on the 
Italians First closed Facebook group, also connected to another Colono web holding, iNews24, 
and “was a member of numerous public and private far-right, nationalist, anti-migrant, and 
anti-Islam Facebook groups, as well as pro-Putin, Five Star Movement, and nationalist Lega   
(Mis)Information Operations: An Integrated Perspective
party leader Matteo Salvini groups” (Nardelli and Silverman 2017). While Colono claimed 
the Granieri account was fake, its activities and connections illustrate how a variety of 
political operators intersect online attempting to shape the information environment. 
Distinguishing one from the other can be very challenging (Nardelli & Silverman 2017).
The Italian political party Lega Nord, now Lega per Salvini Premier (Lega), was also found to be 
using botnets to shape the information environment. Activists supporting Lega used messaging 
boards such as 4chan and 8chan to radicalise and recruit youth (Ebner & Davey 2018). The 
social media managers of Lega also encouraged followers to voluntarily join a botnet to help 
promote and support their candidate, Matteo Salvini (Puente 2018). Activists and supporters 
could give their consent to the automatic publication of supporting messages on their Twitter 
wall by means of an application called ‘LegaNordIllustrator’(Puente 2018). This delivery of 
messaging through authentic social media accounts is arguable and more insidious, as people are 
more likely to accept information coming from people they perceive to be familiar to them 
(Garrett & Weeks 2013). Through recruitment and engagement of people online, Lega could 
direct collective action aimed at pursuing its promotional campaign without violating the terms 
and conditions of social networks such as Twitter. As with The Movement, Lega also had 
supportive Facebook holdings that were found to be fake or in violation of the social network’s 
community standards. One page, Lega Salvini Premier Santa Teresa di riva, shared a video 
which claims to be of migrants attacking a police car. The video, which is in fact from a movie, 
received some 10 million views (Avaaz 2019).
All three of these examples can be considered (mis)information operations as they are directed 
towards a target audience—the electoral constituency present online—with the aim of 
influencing public opinion through misleading activities (fake accounts) or content. 
Throughout, misleading and provocative content is used to fuel divides, particularly on issues 
related to migration, but also health. The network of accounts pushing this content is also vast 
and includes actors with different motivations, such as financial (Colono), religious (La Luce di 
Mari), and political (The Movement and Lega)—each intersecting where it is mutually 
beneficial, but at the same time recruiting and engaging authentic audiences to engage and 
spread content. A common element in the online holdings supporting these actors is a claim of 
being independent or grassroots. This approach might lead unsuspecting consumers to think that 
a given perspective is common to many different independent observers; and, in turn, this 
perspective might gain legitimacy. This risk is compounded when authentic accounts are 
coordinated to spread such material (Shin 2013).
Discussion
What emerges from the example of Italy is that the line between truth and fiction is often blurred 
when dealing with misinformation. Misinformation is not only a matter of content, but also be-
haviour. For this reason, looking just at the content might not be sufficient for identifying 
and addressing (mis)information operations. Confirmation bias seems to lie at the core of the 
problem of misinformation--people tend to seize and frame their beliefs on specific 
information that reinforces their point of view (Schmidt, AL et al. 2018a; Del Vicario et al. 
2016a). This, combined with a changing information environment in which anyone has quick 
access to any type of content almost costless, leads to the emergence of virtual echo chambers, 
groups of like-minded people clustering around a shared narrative, which shape, reinforce, and
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polarize users’ beliefs. These polarized clusters of users seem particularly vulnerable to 
(mis)information operations, which—implementing a series of strategies and tactics aimed at 
promoting specific narratives—inevitably threaten the established social order and trigger 
feelings of distrust by leveraging what communities and social groups deeply fear.
As the matter is complex but absolutely crucial, the approach to addressing it needs to be cross-meth-
odological and grounded on data-driven models by including psychometric and sociometric tests, 
massive data-analysis, as well as computational and network-based tools for both modelling and 
validation. To this respect, it may be useful to provide an integrated proposal for future research. 
Three main aspects seem to be worthy of future investigations: 1) the social-media environment, 
2) the information dynamics, and 3) the use of automated systems for exploiting the cognitive and 
environmental vulnerabilities.
The social-media environment is obviously central. The dynamics of the social-media network 
structure can be characterized by steady rates of change, interrupted by sudden bursts. In particu-
lar, information diffusion in the form of cascades of post resharing often creates sudden bursts of 
new connections, which significantly reshape users’ local network structure (Myers, Seth & Lesk-
ovec 2014). On the other side, the evolution of network structure, together with interdisciplinary 
approaches, might help to identify malicious/fake profiles (Conti, Hasani & Crispo 2013). Social 
media and social networks shape the debate on society and policy issues, but the dynamics of this 
process are not well understood. By monitoring social network activity on a range of issues, in-
fluential users and communities can be detected, communities can be classified according to their 
main interests, and sentiment analysis of the content can be performed to identify the leaning of 
each community towards a set of common topics and to identify controversial issues (Sluban et 
al. 2015; Kralj Novak,  De Amicis & Mozetič 2018). To this respect, the main goal will be that 
of integrating the accumulated knowledge and lessons learned from the opinion polls with the 
new available social-media data sources (Grčar et al. 2017). Moreover, analyses that involve and 
compare different social media are needed in order to understand the universality of certain phe-
nomena such as the presence of echo chambers, patterns of diffusion, and both information and 
misinformation.
Data science is emerging as a means to study information dynamics, including to quantitatively 
characterize and model the processes by which news pieces spread and are consumed, providing 
an early detection system for trends in public opinion. Take an anti-vaccine echo chamber, for 
example. It is now possible to identify which topics are attractive to users and the types of values 
they assign to them—in other words ‘why not vaccinating is supposedly good’—and the beliefs 
underpinning their narrative. Based on that, it would be of interest to further investigate the pos-
sibility of detecting the informational cascades associated with a given topic and potentially neu-
tralizing them. Unfortunately, carrying out an automated classification of misinformation remains 
difficult, particularly given the grey lines where most political opinion falls, but also due to the 
structural properties of content propagation (Conti et al. 2017). Another important aspect relates 
to understanding how the information environment affects the way people express their opinions 
and communicate, or to investigating whether the echo-chamber effect might also affect people’s 
language other than people’s behavior.
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Regarding automated systems, social bot detection is an avenue of research. In the past years, bot 
detection techniques evolved from account-by-account techniques (Davis et al. 2016), where po-
tential bots are compared individually against the elements of a single database of bots, to group 
analysis techniques, where groups of potential bots are jointly assessed through the patterns and 
regularities emerging from their coordinated behavior. The main reason behind such a shift is that 
social bots and botnets can be particularly sophisticated and almost indistinguishable from hu-
mans when analysed on a one-by-one basis (Cresci et al. 2017a). To this respect, two group-based 
detection techniques, namely the Social Fingerprinting (Cresci et al. 2017b) and Retweet-Buster 
(RTBust) (Mazza et al. 2019), have been proven to be particularly effective. In parallel to the shift 
towards group detection, bot detection techniques have also been evolving from supervised to 
unsupervised, and from reactive to proactive approaches (adversarial machine learning). In partic-
ular, a proactive approach starts with an existing model, and it simulates variations in the groups 
of accounts under examination. A new evaluation follows; and, if any of the automated accounts 
are left undetected, a threat is diagnosed. This, in turn, stimulates new design and sets out another 
research cycle. The next generation of techniques should strike a balance between accuracy, 
robustness, and generalizability, especially in light of the fact that the most insidious threats to the 
quality of online conversations might come from hybrid users (cyborgs), whose group 
coordination is less schematic as compared to completely automated accounts. Moreover—as bot 
and botnet detection lies at the convergence of three main communities, that is web and social 
media analysis, cyber intelligence and information security, analytics (data science, machine 
learning, artificial intelligence)—a comprehensive survey of the existing literature would be 
needed, while up-to-date and public datasets might allow more precise taxonomies of social bots 
and wide-ranging comparisons among detection techniques.
Conclusion
This work addresses the problem of misinformation diffusion in the current information environ-
ment. This new disintermediated environment, dominated by social media, opens the door to (mis) 
information operations——that are the specific and organized use of misleading information to 
influence a target audience. The problem is particularly challenging for democracies, which derive 
their legitimacy on trust in information. The approach which has been adopted up to now seems 
to reduce the issue to a dichotomous distinction between falsity and veracity. We proposed to use 
an integrated and interdisciplinary approach to the problem, which takes into account the many 
facets of human cognitions and interactions as well as the complexity of the new information en-
vironment. In particular, we focused on the role played by confirmation bias, and on the relevance 
of specific personality traits, such as the narcissistic trait, in shaping the way in which social media 
users absorb and interact with information. Moreover, we described the ecosystem populating the 
new information environment and how it is manipulated through automated processes. We pro-
ceeded to explore (mis)information operations in the context of the Italian information environ-
ment, highlighting how a complex and holistic approach is necessary to correctly tackle the issue 
of emerging misinformation. Finally, an integrated proposal for future research has been provided 
focusing on three main aspects:  the social-media environment, the information dynamics, and 
the use of automated systems for exploiting the cognitive and environmental vulnerabilities.
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